George Wrisley
george.wrisley@ung.edu

This is the Penultimate Draft of the Paper which Appears in:
The Significance of Indeterminacy: Perspectives from Asian and Continental Philosophy. Part of the Routledge series *Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy*. Eds. Robert H. Scott and Gregory Moss. July 2018.

The Nietzschean Bodhisattva—Passionately Navigating Indeterminacy

While others have written important works that put Buddhism and Nietzsche in conversation, and others still have promoted a socially conscious Buddhism, I have not found works that recognizes the potential of Nietzschean thought to invigorate the Zen Buddhist conception and practice of the Bodhisattva Ideal; the Bodhisattva's goal being to awaken everyone before themselves.[1] As Dale S. Wright notes, Nietzsche has important critical insights concerning the valorizing of a transcendent world and the degradation of *this* world in the history of Western (religious) values. We can also see Mahayana Buddhism as critical of the renunciation of this world—e.g., through its identification of the "world" of enlightenment[2] with that of delusion and its emphasis on compassionate activity in the world—in practice, however:

> We see very few images of lives embodying this abstract concern [for others] in practice; few proposals for institutions or sociopolitical orders that really do care for the poor, underprivileged, and those who are suffering…. Although Mahayana images of nirvana were crafted to *discourage* thinking of the ultimate goal as the extinction of finite life, for the most part Mahayana monks continued to practice as though it was.[3]

Concomitant with this is the ease with which Zen Buddhism can fall into a kind of quietism through the oft seen (partial) description of enlightenment as a state of non-judgmental acceptance of each moment as it is.[4]

In response to these sorts of concerns, this paper seeks to develop the idea of a "Nietzschean Bodhisattva." Doing so is an endorsement of Wright's further claim that, "the history of Buddhism is a history of lineages of successive insights and a history of the unfolding of new possibilities for what true excellence in human life might entail."[5] In other words, what enlightenment means is not fixed or static but develops in new ways in response to newly arising

---

[1] Regarding Nietzsche and Buddhism, see, e.g., Morrison 2002 and Panaioti 2014. Regarding socially conscious Buddhism, see, e.g., Senauke 2010. A question that is in the background of the thinking in this essay is: in what sense could a Goethe or a Beethoven, paradigms of Nietzschean higher types, have been a Buddhist?

[2] While there are a number of issues with the English word, "enlightenment" (see Wright 2016, 1-2 and 199-202 for a helpful discussion), I use it to refer to the ultimate goal of Buddhism. "Nirvana" is also used for this, but in my mind it conjures up thoughts of some realm that one goes to, whereas "enlightenment" or "awakening" refers more directly to a state of the person or their way of engaging the world, which I find preferable.

[3] Wright 2016, 204. Emphasis mine.

[4] See, e.g., Kim 2007, 35 for more on this issue.

[5] Wright 2016, 199.

conditions. The "nature" of enlightenment is, we should say, itself *empty*, i.e., impermanent and interdependent with causes and conditions.

We will construct our image of the Nietzschean Bodhisattva by looking at Nietzsche's conception of the higher type of individual in the context of Eihei Dōgen's Zen and what we can view as its three central indeterminacies—namely, self/other, pain/suffering, and delusion/enlightenment. It is my contention that a Mahayana Buddhist perspective can fruitfully appropriate aspects of Nietzsche's conception of the higher type and see the Bodhisattva as a "higher" type passionately engaged in the world in an effort not only to "awaken" all others but to creatively embody "new" values and ways of skillfully alleviating the suffering of others, including the (systemically) oppressed.

The Zen Buddhist Indeterminacies

The idea of indeterminacy invites the question of whether it itself is indeterminate. If the base sense of the indeterminate is something like, "not exactly known, established, or defined,"[6] do we have equivalent uses of that basic sense in the case of quantum indeterminacy (the inability *to determine* both the momentum and position of a particle, where if you determine one you rule out determining the other), the example in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* where the meaning of an ostensive gesture, e.g., pointing, is indeterminate outside a background language-game, or, to take another example Wittgenstein uses, the Duck-Rabbit illustration of aspect seeing? In this last example, whether it is a duck or a rabbit is indeterminate until it is *made determinate* by seeing it as one or the other.

Regardless of whether these are all the same sort of indeterminacy, they all allow us to see a certain kind of determinacy as *the activity of making determinate that which is indeterminate*. In quantum mechanics, making one aspect determinate necessitates the other aspect remaining indeterminate. With the ostensive gesture, making one meaning determinate does *not* make other meanings indeterminate, it simply rules them out. In the case of the Duck-Rabbit illustration, making one aspect determinate does not make the other aspect indeterminate, it simply leaves it there but not "chosen." Importantly, however, in the Duck-Rabbit illustration, one may see only one aspect, thinking that that is all there is. However, one can "learn" to see both aspects and to shift back and forth between them, and thereby *to fruitfully navigate the indeterminacy*.

In a certain sense, we can see both the concept of the Bodhisattva and the Nietzschean higher type as indeterminate. For, despite all that has been said about the Bodhisattva in Dōgen's and others' writings, what the Bodhisattva's practice comes to needs to be made determinate afresh in new cultural contexts. As Wright stresses:

> …neither Buddhist philosophy nor contemporary standards of thinking would justify Buddhists today continuing to assume as many traditional Buddhists have, that enlightenment is a preexisting human ideal that is fixed and unchanging for all human beings in all times. [7]

[6] Taken from the Apple IOS *New Oxford American Dictionary* app.
[7] Wright 2016, 198.

In what follows, I want to use a reading of Nietzsche's conception of the higher type to make determinate a way of thinking of the Bodhisattva Ideal, in particular, in Dōgen's Zen. The goal is to invigorate and transcend any quietistic aspects of the Bodhisattva Ideal by way of Nietzsche's passionate engagement with life; at the same time, this will shed new light on Nietzsche's project of the revaluation of values, primarily those of suffering and compassion. To be clear, the result is not one I would expect Nietzsche to endorse;[8] that is, while I am taking up large "chunks" of Nietzsche's philosophy, it is not my intent to make my use of them consistent with everything he says, either in any given work or his *oeuvre* more generally.[9] On the other hand, it *is* my intention to make the position I present here as consistent as possible with Dōgen's conception of the Bodhisattva Ideal.

Self and Other

The indeterminacy of self and other requires entering the mountains and deep waters of the Buddhist concept of *no-self*. There have been various approaches to understanding and defending the idea of no-self.[10] Dōgen does not defend it so much as presuppose it, focusing on expressing it, elaborating on it, and getting the reader/listener to realize it through his writings, Dharma talks, and ultimately the creation of a "new" kind of Zen Buddhism.[11]

The issue of no-self is difficult because it concerns the self both over time and at any particular time. While we sometimes acknowledge in the West that we are not the same person we were, say, ten years ago, we still habitually conceptualize ourselves as both self-same over time and separate entities/substances. The latter are "self- contained/determined," i.e., while they may arise from causes/conditions (including other "things), their identity is separate; moreover, they remain numerically identical over time. Because such tendencies of thought are seemingly so ingrained in "human nature" (especially western conceptions of it), Buddhism pushes back rather radically against them. Thus, we find language that denies outright that there are any selves,[12] but this denial of self is of a very particular conception of self—again: one that is a self-contained/determined, persisting entity/substance.

---

[8] While Nietzsche's views on Buddhism cannot be adequately summarized here (again, see, e.g., Morrison 2002 and Panaioti 2014), he had a more favorable opinion of Buddhism than he did Christianity. One reason is that he saw Buddhism as having overcome the vengeful temptations of *ressentiment* (See, e.g., *Ecce Homo*, "Why I am so Wise" §6 and *the Antichrist* §§20-23). Nevertheless, Buddhism was still nihilistic for him; together with Christianity, both were "*décadence* religions" (*Antichrist* §20). A central problem with Buddhism is that he saw it as disparaging suffering and having as its heart the wrong kind of *Mitleid*/pity/compassion (see, e.g., *the Genealogy of Morality*, Preface, §5; on Nietzsche and compassion, more below). Another is that he took the Buddhist desire for "Nirvana" to be a desire for a kind of nothingness (see, e.g., *the Genealogy of Morality*, Part I, §6). While this essay is not intended to be comparative, the reader will be able to discern how Nietzsche's views on Buddhism, particularly in regard to the two main issues above, are problematic. A key problem is that Nietzsche does not clearly distinguish, as Buddhism can be seen to, pain and suffering (more on this below).

[9] Something Nietzsche himself does not always seem interested in doing himself. And, indeed, we can often see Nietzsche as trying on different, often inconsistent perspectives.

[10] See, e.g., Duerlinger 2006 and Siderits 2007.

[11] See, e.g., Heine 2006, chpt. 6, for a discussion relevant to Dōgen's creation of a new form of Zen.

[12] See, for example, the Heart Sutra. For a discussion of its history and importance, see Tanahashi 2016.

One way of approaching the denial of self in the context of Dōgen's Zen, and "self" can refer to anything's purported separate and persisting identity, is that something that we ordinarily think of as a self, say, a tree, is nothing of the sort. In regards to persistence, if we pay attention we will see that every aspect of the tree is impermanent. Further, you will see that every aspect of the tree is what it is only because of every-"thing" else. Consider a square, as it is fairly easy to define; we may think of a square as consisting of a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Those conditions *constitute* any given square. Take any of them away, and you no longer have a square, in concept or reality. Returning to the tree, we might ask what the set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions are that make it a *tree*.[13] Let's assume a necessary condition is that it have some kind of photosynthesizing structure. The idea in Buddhism is that we err in seeing the tree's boundary in terms of such necessary conditions. That is, why stop at those particular structures if the criterion for identifying them is that a tree does not exist if they do not exist? For those very structures themselves do not exist unless other "non-tree" things exist. For example, that which we call "a tree" does not exist unless there is also some sort of soil, water, carbon dioxide, sunlight, etc. So, we might say there is no tree unless there are photosynthesizing structures; but if we say that, why not also say there are no photosynthesizing structure unless there is soil, etc.? And, thus, the tree's existence is coextensive with all of those other "things."[14]

To be clear, no-self is the acknowledgement that every-"thing" is a dynamic process of impermanence and interdependence. And the interdependence of all these "things" is not simply synchronic but also diachronic. *This* tree with its lowlight conditions exists because *that* tree is next to it and taller: synchronic-interdependence. But this tree at this moment is what it is because of yesterday's rain. And so the enfolding is both spatial and temporal. The self of my experience is what it is because of what I experience presently, but that present moment experience is also due to past experiences.[15] For example, the pathos of today's flower is due to having seen the same flower at a loved one's funeral. Each particular "swallows up," to use Dōgen's language, everything else, past and present, and thus conditions, i.e., "spits out," everything going forward.

---

[13] I'm not prepared to deny that trees have essences, but I am skeptical. However, for our purposes, I will simply talk in terms of necessary conditions, leaving aside the question of whether we could specify ones that are jointly sufficient.

[14] We might worry that this conflates the necessary conditions for the tree to be a *tree* with the necessary conditions for that which is a tree to exist in the world—the idea of a tree with what is required for that idea to be instantiated in reality. In other words, logical/conceptual necessity with material/physical necessity. This is certainly an important concern. While we can't begin to address it properly here, we can simply note that the Zen Buddhist ontology that I attribute to Dōgen radically problematizes such a distinction between an idea's/concept's essence and what allows that idea/concept to be actualized. An actual tree is what it is, how it is, only because of past and current causes and conditions (including the seed from which it came, etc.). But even in this interdependence, the *tree* is still a tree—neither completely individual nor completely "washed out" in interdependence: and thus is its indeterminacy.

[15] Calling the nature of present experience, say, of a tree, synchronic is perhaps misleading if we bring in considerations of the time it takes for the light of the tree to reach my eyes, etc. However, it seems to me that despite such complications, there is still value in speaking of the synchronic vs. diachronic conditioning of present experience.

We must be careful here though, while we habitually get trapped into thinking we persist and are contained between our hats and boots,[16] we must not get stuck in the other extreme, thinking that we do not exist at all. We can gain some clarity on this issue by briefly examining Dōgen's firewood analogy. He writes:

> Firewood becomes ash and does not become firewood again. Yet, do not suppose that the ash is after and the firewood before. Understand the firewood abides in its condition as firewood, which fully includes before and after, while it is independent of before and after. Ash abides in its condition of ash, which fully includes before and after. Just as firewood does not become firewood after it is ash, you do not return to birth after death.[17]

The not returning to birth after death does not simply refer to what we ordinarily call bodily death at the end of a life, but rather the moment to moment birth and death we undergo. At the moment of firewood we have discreteness—firewood—but that discreteness while independent of before and after simultaneously contains before and after, and all else. *Before*, as the conditions that gave rise to that moment. *After*, as what is conditioned (burned) firewood. *All else*, as the firewood is both diachronically and synchronically conditioned, interdependent with the rest of the world. Hence, Dōgen writes: "…there are myriad forms and hundreds of grasses [all things] throughout the entire Earth, and yet each form of grass and each form itself is the entire Earth."[18] And, thus, concerning whether a whole person exists at any given moment, *m*, we have to use one of Dōgen's ways of expressing this *nonduality* of all moments synchronically and diachronically: "although not one, not different; although not different, not the same; although not the same, not many."[19] Thus, each moment is empty of substantial, independent existence, but nothing is lost.[20] Each *individual* moment contains all the rest while being independent of all the rest. We thus find here a unique kind of indeterminacy, as each "thing" at each moment is both discrete and all encompassing.

However, again, from the perspective of Zen, we must not fall into the trap of collapsing this indeterminacy in one direction or the other, at least not completely. Thus we have Shohaku Okumura's explaining that we have to express both "sides" of reality in a single action, and Nishiari Bokusan's saying, "There is a point in which you jump off both form and emptiness, and do not abide there."[21] Here "form" means particularity, and "emptiness" the transitory and interdependent nature of that particularity. The enlightened activity of a Buddha is one of expressing both sides in each particular action one performs; this is jumping off both sides. In practical terms this comes to the wisdom of being able to navigate this paradoxical affirmation and denial of particularity, of self and other. In this way the indeterminacy is taken up and simultaneously transcended.

---

[16] To borrow an expression from Walt Whitman's "Song of Myself."
[17] Dōgen 2012, 30.
[18] Dōgen 2012, 105. Interpolation mine.
[19] Dōgen 2012, 451. Compare the philosopher who says a person wholly exists at any given moment and the temporal parts theorists who denies this.
[20] See Dōgen's "The Time Being" fascicle, in Dōgen 2012, for his explicit treatment of this.
[21] Bokusan 2013, 33.

Pain and Suffering

A problem arises if we think of *suffering*[22] and *pain* as synonymous/coextensive in the context of Buddhism's claimed ability to give us the path to the cessation of *suffering*. It is hard to know what it might mean for the human organism not to experience *pain*. This problem is resolved, however, when we distinguish between *suffering* and *pain*, as the Buddha does, e.g., in the *Sallatha Sutta*.[23] Thus, we can say that while *pain* is inevitable, *suffering* is optional.[24] One *suffers* the physical *pain* of, say, a toothache, only when one responds to that pain in a particular way; hence, "When touched with a feeling of pain, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person sorrows, grieves, & laments, beats his breast, becomes distraught. So he feels two pains, physical & mental."[25] Thus, it is not that an enlightened person does not experience pain; rather a Buddha remains unattached and experiences both themselves and pain as non-substantial, i.e., as continually changing and as what they are only in relation to other things.

Those other things are manifold; however, an example is one's past experiences with similar pains. If one has had a tooth ache in the past and that tooth ache lasted five days and kept one from sleeping, then at the onset of a new toothache, one will experience it as suffering if one projects one's past experiences onto present experience in a way that fails to remain open to the ever-changing and interdependent nature of the world/experience. However, if one lets go of that expectation, if one recognizes that each situation is truly different, then there is simply the pain, not the pain extended forward into time with all its imagined consequences.[26]

While we might create a variety of taxonomies of *pain*, one useful one for our purposes is to distinguish between physical and mental/emotional pain. Again, whether any particular pain is suffering depends upon our reaction to it. This is *fairly* straightforward regarding physical pain but is less straightforward regarding emotional pain. This is because it is fairly complicated to tease out the emotional *pain* from the emotional *suffering*, e.g., of losing a loved one. If what makes the difference is a matter of our reaction and that reaction is largely a matter of attachment, then we must get clear about what love is with and without attachment. Much more needs to be said about these complications, but this brief outline of the issue must suffice for

---

[22] We must be careful when we translate the Sanskrit "*dukkha*" or the Japanese "*ku*" into "suffering." All three of these terms have their own nuances; nevertheless, while "*dukkha*" can mean a variety of things, including a more general dissatisfaction, "suffering" works well-enough and is readily found in translations of Dōgen's work.

[23] This sutra is a part of the Theravadan cannon, and though I have not found an instance of Dōgen referencing it, I take it that it is the most reasonable way for any form of Buddhism to resolve the difficulty of claiming that Buddhism is a path to the cessation of suffering.

[24] This is apparently not from a Buddhist Sutra. A google search indicates that its source is anonymous and not attributable to the Buddha. Nevertheless, it is a nice way of making the point.

[25] "Sallatha Sutta: The Arrow."

[26] It is important and interesting to note in this context the recent research on pain and pain perception. Contrary to the reasonable seeming idea that the experience of pain is the simple and direct result of nerves responding to stimulation, there is good reason to believe that the experience of pain is a product of nerve stimulation *and* the way a subject (and we might say their culture/society) contextualizes and assigns meaning to the pain/kind of pain in question. One example of the "plasticity" of pain is called "catastrophizing." See, the May 2017 issue of *Scientific American Mind* on pain, which has a helpful discussion of this phenomenon and much more.

here.[27] The central point for us is that we can see any particular moment of *pain* in itself as indeterminate regarding whether it amounts to *suffering*.

Delusion and Enlightenment

"It is axiomatic in Zen Buddhism that delusion and enlightenment constitute a nondual unity…."[28] The difficulty, of course, is how to understand this unity, for as Hee-Jin Kim further notes, "the interface of delusion and enlightenment in their, dynamic, nondual unity is extremely complex, elusive, and ambiguous."[29] We have already come across this "nondual unity" in our discussion of the nonduality of self and other. Where Okumura notes that we must express both sides of reality, unity and difference,[30] Kim above writes of "two foci." Whether enlightened or deluded, one navigates the "same" reality: "Delusion and enlightenment differ from one another perspectivally, are never metaphysical opposites…, and are both temporal, coextensive, and coeternal as ongoing salvic processes."[31] As Dōgen puts it, "Those who greatly enlighten delusion are Buddhas. Those who are greatly lost in enlightenment are sentient beings."[32] Delusion is where Buddhas "operate," and that which "is enlightenment," i.e., reality's impermanence and interdependence, is what sentient beings are lost in (deluded about). Kim: "…enlightenment consists not so much in replacing as in dealing with or 'negotiating' delusion…"[33] While free of delusion a Buddha nevertheless moves about "in it."

There is a problematic tendency, especially in Zen Buddhism, to overly privilege equality and non-discrimination, as though enlightenment meant escaping delusion/suffering by way of seeing all things as equal and one, free of concepts, conceptions, and distinctions. Contrary to this, the nonduality that is delusion/enlightenment does not fuzz out distinctions and differences, much less the need to differentiate. I follow Kim's reading[34] of this, namely that the point is that we do not realize and actualize emptiness appropriately if we do not make note of differences (one of the two foci), if we do not take the focus of form (delusion) seriously. We cannot, then, properly realize enlightenment without discriminating, without weighing differences, without lingering in delusion while being nevertheless free of delusion.

A further aspect of the interpenetration of delusion and enlightenment is that a Buddha *enacts* enlightenment within delusion, where enacting is meant to highlight that enlightenment is not so much an epistemological state of mind as it is an embodied practice that implicates the mind.[35]

---

[27] I am unfortunately unaware of any explicit treatment of this complication regarding the distinction between pain and suffering in the Buddhist context. However, regarding love and attachment, see, e.g., Newland 2016.
[28] Kim 2007, 1.
[29] Kim 2007, 1-2.
[30] Okumura 2010, 18.
[31] Kim 2007, 4
[32] Ishida 2010, 10.
[33] Kim 2007, 4.
[34] For example, Kim 2007, 43. Consider, too, Dōgen and Uchiyama 2005, 38 and 46.
[35] By "mind" here, I mean more or less the individual mind of a discrete person; however, I do not mean this to contradict or deny the sense of "mind" that is often at play in Dōgen's Zen, whereby what is translated as "mind" in English can mean a variety of things. See Kim 2004, 116-125 for a helpful discussion of Dōgen's views on mind.

The deluded sentient being collapses the pain/suffering indeterminacy onto the side of suffering, whereas the enlightened Buddha collapses it onto the side of "mere" pain. Here the enactment is a matter of realized, habituated, and embodied responses to the reality of pain: a Buddha realizes the transitory and interdependent nature of pain, themselves, and the world, and, as we saw earlier, is not "stuck" in either its form or its emptiness; by contrast, a deluded sentient being "lost in enlightenment" cannot help but linger on the "side" of self, delusion, and suffering, experiencing and enacting themselves as discrete, separate selves who are the unique owners of *their* pain and therefore also of suffering.

Centrally, in Dōgen's Zen, enlightenment/Nirvana is not some otherworldly destination. However, neither is it straightforwardly the *result* of practice. It is not that one has to, say, meditate for years or lifetimes and only then, and maybe not even then, achieve *insight into the nature of reality* in a way that is supposed to constitute enlightenment.[36] Rather, again, enlightenment is something that a Buddha *enacts*. For Dōgen this idea is expressed in his talk of the oneness of practice and enlightenment.[37] As soon as one sincerely practices, one is already "there," but we must not understand practice to mean to merely to sit in *Zazen*. That is, one may take the Buddha-form, i.e., sit cross-legged in *Zazen* and nevertheless not really be practicing because, for example, one does not have the right intention; further, one may practice enlightenment off the cushion, i.e., *zazen* is not merely something one practices on the cushion. Thus, every activity, whether on the cushion or not becomes *zazen*.

The Nietzschean Higher Type

Nietzsche writes a great deal on the noble, higher types, and their creativity and genius. I want "merely" to focus on what I take to be a few paradigmatic passages so as to lay out in broad strokes key features of his understanding of these terms. Despite his bellicose rhetoric, writers and artists tend to be Nietzsche's primary examples of higher types—Goethe and Beethoven being two of his paradigmatic examples. In a lengthy passage from *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche describes Goethe's greatness. [38] From that passage we can innumerate the following points as descriptive of the higher type. Higher types: [1] take on as much responsibility and as many projects as they can; [2] they create themselves, overcoming/transcending their past selves; [3] they are tolerant and magnanimous, not because of some pressure from without but because their strength affords them a certain "kindness" and imperturbability; [4] they are joyful in their ability to affirm what is, not condemning suffering or what others may experience as undesirable. While we might be able to extract any number of other characteristics from Nietzsche's writings, a further central one for our purposes is, [5]:

> The noble type of man experiences *itself* as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges, "what is harmful to me is harmful in itself"; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is *value-creating*.[39]

[36] Kim wonderfully takes apart such a view; see, e.g., chapter 1 of his 2007. None of this negates that there is still a difference between sitting with realization and sitting without; but there is not room here to further elaborate on this complicated subject. Again, see, e.g., Kim 2007.
[37] See, e.g., Dōgen 2012, 3-22.
[38] Nietzsche 1990, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," §49.
[39] Nietzsche 1992, *Beyond Good and Evil* (hereafter BGE) §260.

The projects of the higher type are like those of Nietzsche, Goethe, and Beethoven—they change the world through their creative endeavors, including the "creation" of value.

In what follows, I want to try to describe more than defend what I take is a part of Nietzsche's position regarding value "creation." Consider his discussion of master vs. slave morality. In considering these differing value systems, Nietzsche evaluates them in relation to their ability to produce humans capable of great cultural achievements. The slave morality for Nietzsche is likely to result in ignoble productions. Thus, it is not a question for Nietzsche as to which system of values corresponds to some kind of Platonic ideal of true virtue; rather, as one might suspect, his (r)evaluation of values depends on his holding something else as of ultimate value, e.g., cultural productions. And, thus, we might see his revaluation and creation of values, not so much as a literal creation of values *ex nihilo*, whatever that might mean, but rather as a kind of "re-describing" or "reorienting" in regard to *what we should value*. Nietzsche thinks that, largely due to ascetic religions, we find Western and Eastern civilizations have come to value the wrong things and, importantly, have improperly devalued suffering. Therefore, value creation is a matter of "creating" "new" ways of deeming, and living out, value.

The higher individual, then, "creates values" by way of what they deem valuable: "*This* is important and worthy of my attention and efforts!" Not just anything goes, however. This "deeming" of the higher type must come from strength, not weakness, from an overflowing of their being.[40] And Nietzsche makes clear that the higher type is the one who shows true forms of magnanimity and compassion.[41] The values created by the higher type are not those of a scoundrel.

---

[40] See, e.g., Nietzsche 1974, §370. And in BGE §260 (Nietzsche 1992) we find a line important in the context of this paper: "…the noble human being, too, helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from pity [Mitleid], but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power." It is interesting to consider how we should understand "power" in the context of the Bodhisattva Ideal.

[41] As discussed in note 8 above, one of the greatest tensions between Nietzsche's work and what we are doing here concerns *das Mitleid*/pity/compassion (*das Mitleid* for the rest of this endnote. We will not be able to even begin to do justice to this issue. However, I want to at least note one of the more significant issues. In BGE §225, Nietzsche makes the claim that in a person there is both *creature* and *creator*. Here Nietzsche seems to say that the creature part needs to suffer in order for the creator part to truly be what it is. Ordinary *das Mitleid* seeks to alleviate the suffering of the creature part. And here Nietzsche distinguishes another kind of *das Mitleid*; it is a *Mitleid* that laments the negative effects of ordinary *Mitleid*, how the latter makes not only the individual but also the species smaller and weaker: more mediocre. The higher, creative types need their suffering; *das Mitleid* directed at them means turning up the resistance, the difficulty of things, the weight and number of responsibilities—turning up the suffering. Again, while this topic is far too large to address here with any adequacy, we can say that Nietzsche's distinction between two kinds of *das Mitleid* becomes more problematic when we introduce our distinction between pain and suffering. As will be addressed in the body of the paper, *das Mitleid* of the bodhisattva is much more nuanced than *das Mitleid* for the creature part that Nietzsche distinguishes from that for the creator part of a human being.

See Reginster 2006 for an excellent discussion of Nietzsche's revaluation of *das Mitleid*. For helpful discussion of the differences between pity and compassion in the contexts of both Buddhism and translating from a language that only has a single word for both, see Conway 2001.

Consider Goethe; his life is an example of the kind of values he deemed worthy of pursuing and he helped to shape the values of the German people, e.g., through his creative works, the characters he created in his writings, the kinds of lives they lived, what was important to them, etc. Nietzsche presumably sees himself as a similar sort of transformative figure, given his confrontation with suffering and his "creation of values" through his writings. Central to this project is his desire to "revalue" suffering, which he sees as having a long history of being devalued and condemned as the worst thing, that which must be avoided or mitigated (via traditionally conceived *das Mitleid*/pity/compassion) at all costs and as quickly as possible.

Importantly, neither Goethe nor Nietzsche "created" brand new values from scratch, of course. Goethe is responding to, building on, and transforming sentiments and valuations that are already present in his culture, and which have a long history. The same with Nietzsche; moreover, with Nietzsche we see him seemingly harking back to "old" values found in Ancient Greece, for example. However, we might say that even though the values "created" by Goethe and Nietzsche are not wholly new, we can see them as creating values that are new in the sense of the details of their contours and in the ways that they should be lived. For example, what it means to be indomitable in the context of Homer's *Iliad* and in the context of Nietzsche's life are very different in regard to how that way of being is expressed, what it demands, etc.

The Bodhisattva Ideal

We might say that the Bodhisattva is defined by the Bodhisattva's vow. One translation of which is:

> Beings are numberless; I vow to awaken them.
> Delusions are inexhaustible; I vow to transform them.
> Dharma gates are boundless; I vow to comprehend them.
> The awakened way is incomparable; I vow to embody it.[42]

As Kim notes, "These vows are recited, reflected upon, and meditated on by monastics day and night, to such an extent that the lives of monastics are, in essence, the *embodiment* of vows."[43] The Bodhisattva takes this vow so seriously that she delays "final" enlightenment and returns "birth after birth" to help free sentient beings from suffering.

There are two basic senses of *Bodhisattva* in play with Dōgen and Mahayana Buddhism more generally. That is, there is the Bodhisattva as a way of practicing Buddhism, i.e., the pursuit of liberation for all and of the Mahayana ideal; there is also the Bodhisattva as an "object of faith and devotion."[44] In this latter sense, there is a whole "pantheon."[45] In his fascicle "Avalokiteshvara,"[46] Dōgen venerates the mythical Bodhisattva of great compassion, Avalokiteshvara. He is said to have a thousand arms and eyes. So many arms (hands) and eyes

[42] Tanahashi 2015, 30.
[43] Kim 2004, 204. Emphasis mine.
[44] Kim 2004, 204.
[45] See, for example, Leighton 2012.
[46] Avalokiteshvara is also the central speaker in the *Heart Sutra*.

are representative of Avalokiteshvara's ability to extend his "infinite compassion" to all beings.[47] Given Dōgen's identification of Avalokiteshvara as the "parent of all buddhas" [48] and given that he is the bodhisattva of great compassion, it is not hard to see why Kim would conclude that, "The essence of the bodhisattva ideal [is] great compassion." Importantly, Kim continues:

> [The bodhissatva ideal] was [for Dōgen] the reconciliation of the dualistic opposites of self and nonself, sentient and insentient, Buddhas and sentient beings…. The identity of "I" and "you" in thusness [emptiness/Buddha-nature], rather than identity in substance, status, or the like, was the fundamental metaphysical and religious ground of great compassion.[49]

Acts of compassion—which infuse every action of a Bodhisattva who embodies emptiness through the care and attention to everything done, said, and thought—are the expression of the two sides of reality, form and emptiness, in a single, compassionate action.

It is vital to note that we can see compassionate action in Buddhism need not "merely" as a matter of teaching the Dharma, i.e., Buddhist teachings/truths. Consider the social movement of engaged Buddhism. A prominent advocate of engaged Buddhism, Alan Senauke, writes:

> It is hard to define engaged Buddhism. But I think it has to do with a willingness to see how deeply people suffer; to understand how we have fashioned whole systems of suffering out of gender, race, caste, class, ability, and so on; and to know that interdependently and individually we co-create this suffering. Looking around we plainly see a world at war, a planet in peril.
>
> Some days, I call this engaged Buddhism; on other days I think it is just plain Buddhism — walking the Bodhisattva path, embracing the suffering of beings by taking responsibility for them.[50]

On one hand, from the Buddhist perspective, even if there were no systems of oppression revolving around gender, race, etc., people would still suffer profoundly due, we might say, to their ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, etc. Hence, the emphasis in Buddhism on spreading the Dharma. But as Senauke points out, we cannot ignore the various systems of oppression that compound people's suffering and confound their ability to mitigate it. In this context we should consider Gary Snyder's warning:

> Institutional Buddhism has been conspicuously ready to accept or ignore the inequalities and tyrannies of whatever political system it found itself under. This can be death to Buddhism, because it is death to any meaningful function of compassion. Wisdom without compassion feels no pain.[51]

---

[47] Kim 2004, 207.
[48] Dōgen 2012, 397-98.
[49] Kim 2004, 208. We will see below in detail what is meant by reconciling these opposites, including what is meant by the reconciliation of the sentient and insentient.
[50] Senauke 2010, iii.
[51] Snyder 1969, 90.

Thus, it is vital to Zen that the compassionate activity of the Bodhisattva extends beyond teaching those who are under the boot of the oppressor how to avoid experiencing that heavy boot as suffering. We must not become trapped in the idea that the Dharma/enlightenment is enough in regard to alleviating suffering. If, for example, we look at the history of Buddhism, say in Japan, we can see sexist practices flourishing in the midst of purportedly enlightened monks and monasteries. We might put it so: the Dharma needs the wisdom of feminist scholarship/activism and the latter needs the wisdom of the Dharma.

The Nietzschean Bodhisattva

Let's now consider how, in the context of our three indeterminacies, we can view the Bodhisattva as a Nietzschean higher type. To begin, Nietzsche's higher/lower type dichotomy is transformed in the context of Zen and our three indeterminacies. For Nietzsche, there is a definitive connection between the higher type as a kind of noble master and the lower type as an ignoble slave. This kind of value-hierarchy, as a normative valuation of people's worth, is anathema to Zen Buddhism. Instead, in the Zen context, "higher" comes to refer to "enlightened"/"skillful in practice" and "lower" to "being deluded"/ "non-skillful in practice." The Bodhisattva *enacts* enlightenment, operating within delusion. Those who do not enact enlightenment through the way they live their lives, are lost in delusion. It is not that they are less valuable; rather, they are unskillful in their lives, creating suffering for themselves and others, and are thereby "lower" than the Bodhisattva.

Let us look at the five points we earlier emphasized regarding Goethe as a Nietzschean higher type and see how they may be transformed and embraced by the (Nietzschean) Bodhisattva.

[1] Responsibility and suffering:

As Nietzsche emphasizes, "the greatness of man" stands in relation to "…how many things one could bear and take upon himself, how *far* one could extend his responsibility."[52] We see in the Bodhisattva vow how much the Bodhisattva takes upon themselves. That is, by vowing to awaken all beings, to "come back" life after life until that infinitely impossible task is completed, the Bodhisattva hoists upon their back infinite responsibility. While there are a variety of "mythic" Bodhisattvas, and while there is the danger in the monastic setting for the Zen Bodhisattva to be relegated to the monastery and not "directly" engaged with the world, the Nietzschean Bodhisattva leaps off the cushion and engages the world in all of its turmoil and messiness. Thus, for the Nietzschean Bodhisattva, the vow is not merely an "abstract ideal" to ground one's practice, but is an active call to wade into the deep mud of the world.[53]

In the context of responsibility and suffering, let us consider further the indeterminacy of pain and suffering. In a powerful passage, Nietzsche writes:

[52] Nietzsche 1992, BGE §212.

[53] I do not mean to imply that the practice of the monks in monasteries should be viewed simply as quietistic, disengagement with the world outside. For example, the monks in their concentrated practice, maintain the dharma as a kind of storehouse, since it is easy for it to become lost or diffuse in the distraction of the world outside. Further, monasteries often engage their local community.

> You want, if possible—and there is no more insane "if possible"—*to abolish suffering*. And we? It really seems that we would rather have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you understand it—that is no goal, that seems to us an *end*, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible—that makes his destruction *desirable*.
> The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far?[54]

While it is true that the Bodhisattva seeks to alleviate the suffering of others and thereby their own, this is not the absurd idea that it is possible *to abolish*, to alleviate all pain, whatever its form. To live is to experience a complex and variegated spectrum of pain. Enlightenment means not the cessation of pain, but the cessation of suffering that arises from how one responds to pain. Nevertheless, it is true that the Bodhisattva seeks to alleviate suffering and minimize pain, and, thus, they are not going all the way with Nietzsche here in regard to wanting pain/suffering "higher and worse than ever." Nevertheless, the goal of ending pain is itself marked by a) the recognition that pain/suffering can be valuable teachers and the compassion of the Bodhisattva may well include letting others linger in their suffering/pain as long as it is a skillful way to help them further along the path of awakening, a point well in line with Nietzsche here and elsewhere; and b) the recognition that suffering arises from pain when one is attached to removing the pain.

Point a) above engages Nietzsche's mantra that suffering is necessary for human flourishing. Particularly in the context of the pain/suffering indeterminacy, Buddhism can well acknowledge this necessity. But we can also push back a bit against Nietzsche by pointing out that he is perhaps a bit too epistemically cavalier about the ability of people to properly assess the *suffering threshold* of another, and perhaps even of oneself. That is, while it is certainly true that pain/suffering are vital in many of the ways Nietzsche emphasizes throughout his writings, regarding his reconceptualization of compassion, he does not seem to acknowledge the epistemic difficulties of knowing when and how much pain/suffering is necessary.[55] And here we might assert, too, that it is simply not true that without further ado "what doesn't kill us makes stronger."

[2] Self-creation and self-overcoming:

In Dōgen's Zen, there is no fixed self. What we, in delusion, label a self, is an ever-changing nexus of causes and conditions whose fundamental ontological locus is the specious and ephemeral present moment, one which, as we saw, "contains" the past, present, and future. In this context, the Bodhisattva creates "themselves" through the way they engage in the world.

[54] Nietzsche 1992, BGE §225

[55] An issue that we cannot here take up, but which would be fruitful to address, is whether our distinction between pain/suffering is capable of undercutting Nietzsche's concern that suffering is necessary for greatness, and since traditional compassion is seen as the attempt to remove suffering, it should also be seen as interfering with greatness. Reginster, e.g., writes, "… Nietzsche defines greatness in terms of power, or the overcoming of resistance, so that there cannot be greatness without suffering" (2006, 186). Suffering and resistance are here being equated. However, if we can make sense of resistance in terms of *pain* and not suffering, then Buddhist compassion need not succumb to this Nietzschean worry.

As Dōgen makes clear, e.g., in his two fascicles on continuous practice, there is no point at which one is done "making a Buddha."[56] Regardless of one's "degree of awakening," there is always further insight, further realization, i.e., new ways to enact enlightenment (centered around compassion) in the ever-changing context of causes and conditions that one encounters. In this way the Bodhisattva both creates themselves and continually overcomes their self, both the individual self that is this body and mind, and the self that is the entire earth.

[3] Tolerant and magnanimous due to their strength:

Rather close to Nietzsche's own thinking, we find in Buddhism, and this is certainly applicable to Dōgen's Zen, the idea that in order to develop patience and tolerance, one needs to have confronted many enemies.[57] Patience and tolerance must be "tested" and ultimately habituated, and the only way to do either is to practice them in response to difficult people and situations, which requires magnanimity and strength.

The Bodhisattva who is trying to awaken others through the Dharma, and who seeks to work on social injustices, oppression, etc., needs both patience/tolerance and self-discipline. Consider again, the Bodhisattva's vow to awaken all beings. This is a task that calls for "infinite" patience, tolerance, and strength in a world that resists awakening and which has forms of oppression built into its social, political, and economic structures. The wider the variety of difficult experiences faced, the broader and deeper the Bodhisattva develops skills and abilities to navigate ever-evolving situations.

[4] Joyful in their affirming what is; not condemning suffering as undesirable:

For Nietzsche, joyful affirmation is a central trait of the higher type. In his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche challenges higher types to joyfully affirm what is, i.e., every moment of one's life, including those that are painful, difficult, etc., even if those moments were to be repeated for eternity. For Nietzsche, only the strong, higher, noble types could make such a radical affirmation of their lives. In this context, suffering, too, is revaluated. One should not condemn it or try to ameliorate it as quickly as possible. Rather, suffering's instrumental and contributory value in regard to being a higher type needs to be appreciated and affirmed.

Similarly, the Bodhisattva, in their acceptance of how things are and in their appreciation of the transitory and interdependent nature of everything, experiences a kind of joy in their simultaneous identification with and letting go of the world they experience. This does not, of course, mean that the Bodhisattva does not experience any of the suffering they confront as painful. When we bring in the indeterminacy of pain/suffering, we can recognize that the Bodhisattva can be moved by the suffering of others, experiencing it as painful, and yet still find joy therein.

Recognizing this upshot of the pain/suffering indeterminacy allows us to finesse the above condition on the higher type; namely, the higher type does not condemn suffering as undesirable. The Nietzschean Bodhisattva is certainly moved to try to bring the suffering of the world to an

[56] See Dōgen 2012, "Continuous Practice" Parts One and Two.
[57] See, e.g., Shantideva 1998, 55.

end, but, again, this is not a blanket or flatfooted condemnation of suffering. For Nietzsche, there is not a clear distinction between pain (*der Schmerz*) and suffering (*das Leiden*). For the Bodhisattva, however, there is. While they seek to bring suffering to an end, they do not believe that it is possible to bring pain to an end: even if they may try to minimize the pain of others, since others who are not yet awake tend to experience pain as suffering. As noted above, the Bodhisattva recognizes the need for pain, difficulty, hindrances, challenges, in short, enemies, for their practice; hence, they do not shy away from, nor condemn all pain and suffering.

[5] Determining/creating values through their "deeming" and way of living, their being exemplars:

How are we to understand the Bodhisattva's creativity? In what way is the Bodhisattva creative? For Nietzsche, the (r)evaluation/creation of values is guided by an appreciation of cultural productions; for the Bodhisattva, the "creation" of values is guided by the notion of skillful action that alleviates suffering. In this context, I want to suggest that there are *at least* two important senses of the Bodhisattva's creativity. The first is that the Bodhisattva goes beyond past Bodhisattva's, making the Bodhisattva path their own. This creativity is needed since no two lives are the same in the challenges, obstacles, people, situations, etc., that they engage and navigate. Secondly, the Bodhisattva must be creative in finding ways to alleviate the suffering of others. While not directed at the Bodhisattva, the following points from bell hooks are applicable to the way in which the Bodhisattva must be creative in their engagement with the world beyond "simply" trying to awaken others. Concerning the suffering of the poor, hooks writes,

> The poor are not fooled when the privileged offer castoffs and worn-out hand-me-downs as a gesture of "generosity" while buying only the new and best for themselves. This form of charity necessarily often backfires. Embedded in such seemingly "innocent" gestures are mechanisms of condescension and shaming that often assault the psyches of the poor. No doubt that is why so many poor people in our culture regard charitable gestures with suspicion. It is always possible to share resources in ways that enhance rather than devalue the humanity of the poor. *It is the task of those who hold greater privilege to create practical strategies, some of which become clearer when we allow ourselves to fully empathize, to give as we would want to be given to.*[58]

The contemporary Bodhisattva must navigate a host of difficult issues particularly in a world that is beset with stark hierarchies and dualities involving race, class, gender, ability, sexual orientation, etc. Such complexities call for a sensitive *creativity* if they are to be successful and not received as insincere or condescending instances of "good will."

In the above passage from hooks, we see the four explicit activities of the Bodhisattva.[59] That is: kind speech, generosity, beneficial action, and "identity action." I take it as fairly clear how the first three would need to be manifested in the context of hooks' passage. The fourth, "identity

[58] hooks 2000, 47-48 emphasis mine. I am reminded in this context, too, of Benjamin O. Arah's emphasis of a point made by Dr. King: "[he] argued that his civil disobedience and philosophy of nonviolent protest were *creative* forms for direct action in the strategic fight against white segregation and racial injustice." Arah 2014, 285. Emphasis mine.

[59] See Dōgen 2012, "The Bodhisattva's Four Methods of Guidance."

action," is not so obvious; it is the translation of the Japanese *dōji* 同事, which is a standard translation for *samānârthatā*, the bodhisattva virtue of "shared concern," in the sense of "working together" with others.[60] The idea is that one identifies with those one helps through shared concern that goes beyond "merely" giving goods. It is the kind of action that comes from working together with others and seeing the other as oneself.[61] In the context of Dōgen's Zen, this is a way of compassionately expressing both sides of reality, i.e., sameness and difference, affirming both separate individual identities and the whole that working together "forms" in the context of emptiness. We see here the reach of the demands on the Bodhisattva. They do not stand aloof, but creatively work together with those they serve toward a common end. And in this context "create," i.e., help specify/deem what is of value given the end of alleviating suffering. We might even see this as a revaluation of contemporary (Western) values—ones that underwrite practices of inequality, oppression, and suffering.

As Nietzsche sought to overcome the values inherent in the history of religion and "create" "new" ones, the Nietzschean Bodhisattva, in the contemporary (Western) world, seeks to overcome the values that underlie modern systems of oppression, e.g.,, those of capitalism and white supremacy, and thereby "creates" "new" ways of valuing. These new ways are ones that support not only (Buddhist) enlightenment but autonomy, equality, equity, and justice in a world mired in oppression and inequality.

While this chapter has been necessarily programmatic and broad brushed in drawing connections between the Nietzschean higher type and the Buddhist Bodhisattva, in closing we might briefly qualify their alignment by noting that Nietzsche views egalitarian goals as privileging the many over the few, the few who, in the world he desires to see, are to be creators of value and culture. However, it is not clear, given the nature of the indeterminacies we have outlined, why a creative genius could not be a Bodhisattva creating culture and value in the context of their vow to awaken and save all sentient beings, as argued here. However, and importantly, the practice of a Nietzschean Bodhisattva could even involve the creation of art, music, etc., all with soteriological ends. Such value creation would not be that of the "high culture" of Western Europe that Nietzsche privileges, but so be it; "high culture" is no goal for us.

---

[60] I owe these points about "identity action" to a very helpful correspondence with Carl Bielefeldt.

[61] Writing in this way, I do not mean to imply that the Nietzschean Bodhisattva cannot be a person experiencing oppression firsthand—they certainly may be. Indeed, Arah, again writing on King's position: "[King] further explained that the one *creative* thing that an oppressed person can do has to do with how he approaches his state of oppression or condition…." (Emphasis mine). Of the three choices such a person has, "…the 'third way' or the choice of nonviolent resistance" (2014, 285) is the one, as above, identified by King as *creative*. The point is not necessarily to say that King was a Nietzschean Bodhisattva, though that is an interesting question, but rather to emphasize the ways creativity may manifest and who can be a Nietzschean Bodhisattva.

Bibliography

Anālayo. 2015. *Compassion and emptiness in buddhist meditation*. Cambridge: Windhorse Publications.

Arah, B.O. 2014. "Socrates, Thoreau, Gandhi, and the Philosopher/Activist Dr. King: Politics of Civil Disobedience and the Ethics of Nonviolent Action." In Birt, R. E. (Ed.). (2014). *The liberatory thought of Martin Luther King Jr. critical essays on the philosopher King*. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books. 275-295.

Bokusan, Nishiari. 2013. "Commentary on Dogen's Genjo Koan." Trans. Sojun Mel Weitsman and Kazuaki Tanahashi. In *Dogen's Genjo Koan: Three Commentaries*. Berkeley: Counterpoint Press, 2013.

Conway, Jeremiah. 2001. "A Buddhist Critique of Nussbaum's Account of Compassion." *Philosophy in the Contemporary World*, vol. 8. No. 1.

Dōgen & Uchiyama, K. 2005. *How to cook your life: from the Zen kitchen to enlightenment* (T. Wright, Trans.). Boston: Shambhala.

Dōgen. 2012. *Treasury of the true dharma eye: Zen master Dogens Shobo genzo* (K. Tanahashi, Trans.). Boston, MA: Shambhala.

Duerlinger, J. 2006. *Indian Buddhist theories of persons: Vasubandhus "Refutation of the theory of a self*." London: Routledge Curzon.

Heine, S. 2006. *Did Dogen go to China?: What he wrote and when he wrote it*. New York: Oxford University Press.

hooks, b. 2000. *Where we stand: class matters*. New York: Routledge.

Ishida, Hoyu. 2010. "'Genjôkôan': Some Literary and Interpretative problems of Its Translation." *Academic Reports of the University Center for Intercultural Education, the University of Shiga Prefecture*.

Leiter, Brian. 2002. *Nietzsche on Morality*. Routledge, London and New York.

Kim, H., & Leighton, T. D. 2004. *Eihei Dōgen: mystical realist*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Kim, H. 2007. *Dōgen on meditation and thinking: a reflection on his view of Zen*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

King, M. L. 2006. *A testament of hope: the essential writings and speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (J. M. Washington, Ed.). New York: HarperOne, an imprint of HarperCollins .

Leighton, T. D. 2012. *Faces of compassion: classic bodhisattva archetypes and their modern expression: an introduction to Mahayana Buddhism*. Somerville, MA: Wisdom.

Morrison, R. G. 2002. *Nietzsche and Buddhism: a study in nihilism and ironic affinities*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

Newland, G. 2016. *A Buddhist grief observed*. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications.

Nietzsche, F. 1974. *The Gay Science, with a prelude in rhymes and a appendix of songs* (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books.

Nietzsche, F. W. 1990. *Twilight of the idols; The Anti-Christ* (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.; M. Tanner, Ed.). Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin.

Nietzsche, F. W. 1992. *Basic writings of Nietzsche* (W. A. Kaufmann, Trans.). New York: Modern Library.

Okumura, S., & D. 2010. *Realizing Genjōkōan: the key to Dōgens Shōbōgenzō*. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Panaioti, A. 2014. *Nietzsche and Buddhist philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reginster, B. 2006. *The affirmation of life: Nietzsche on overcoming nihilism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sallatha Sutta: The Arrow (T. Bhikkhu, Trans.). 1997. Retrieved July 05, 2017, from http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.006.than.html

Scientific American Mind. 2017. "Special Report: Pain: New Ways to Find Relief without Opioids." May 2017. Vol. 28, Issue 3.

Senauke, A. 2010. *The Bodhisattvas embrace: dispatches from engaged Buddhisms front lines*. Berkeley, CA: Clear View Press.

Shantideva. 1998. *A guide to the Bodhisattavas way of life* (S. Batchelor, Trans.). Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan works and archives.

Siderits, M. 2007. *Buddhism as philosophy: an introduction*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

Snyder, G. 1969. *Earth House Hold*. New York: New Directions.

Tanahashi, K., & Nagase, M. 2015. *Zen chants: thirty-five essential texts with commentary*. Boston, MA: Shambhala.

Tanahashi, K. 2016. *The Heart sutra: a comprehensive guide to the classic of Mahayana Buddhism*. Boulder: Shambhala.

Wright, D. S. 2016. *What is Buddhist enlightenment?* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.